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Doherty: Denying the Environment a Stay of Execution Is Par for the Course

DENYING THE ENVIRONMENT A STAY OF EXECUTION IS
PAR FOR THE COURSE: THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
OF THE CWA AND NEPA IN GREATER YELLOWSTONE
COALITION v. FLOWERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Wetlands are an indispensable and fragile element of a healthy
aquatic ecosystem.1 They mitigate the effects of floods, limit erosion and purify water. 2 Additionally, wetlands serve as a nesting
habitat for a variety of birds, including the bald eagle. 3 Suburban
sprawl and industrial and commercial development have emerged
as dual threats to the wetland ecosystem and the life that it
4
supports.
5
Historically, wetlands were perceived as unproductive. Commonly known as marshes or swamps, wetlands cannot be used for
traditional agricultural or industrial purposes. 6 During the nine1. See Timothy D. Searchinger, Wetlands Issues 1993: Challenges and a New Approach, 4 MD. J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 13, 40 (1992/93) (noting that wetlands
safeguard integrity of aquatic ecosystem). An aquatic ecosystem is defined as waters, including wetlands, that provide habitat for populations of plants and animals. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.3(c) (2005). Wetlands are defined as "areas that are
inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support .. .a prevalence of vegetation." Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act: How Wetlands are Defined and Identified, www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/factl 1.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Section 404 Overview] (defining wetland). The Corps and the EPA have used this definition since
the 1970s. See id.
2. See Richard C. Ausness, Regulatory Takings and Wetland Protection in the PostLucas Era, 30 LAND & WATER L. REv. 349, 355-56 (1995) (recognizing wetland
benefit).
3. See id. (indicating habitat function of wetlands).
4. See Cheryl L. Jamieson, Comment, An Analysis of Municipal Wetlands and
Their Relationshipto the Convention on Wetlands of InternationalImportance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat,4 PACE ENvrI. L. REV. 177, 179 (1986) (discussing need for wetland protection). Although the bald eagle was reclassified from endangered to
threatened, it still faces many threats. See Soaring to Recovery, http://www.fws.gov/
chesapeakebay/baldeagl.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2005) (discussing bald eagle
designation). Human disturbance results in habitat destruction, which is detrimental to the bald eagle. See Spotlight on Species, http://www.sierraclub.org/wildlife/species/disappearing.species/bald.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (noting role
of human disturbance in habitat destruction).
5. See Ausness, supra note 2, at 354-55 (noting historical view of wetlands).
6. SeeJason Perdion, Comment, Protecting Wetlands Through the Clean Water Act
and the 1985 and 1990 Farms Bills: A Winning Trio, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 867, 867-68
(1997) (discussing how wetlands were targeted for conversion to agricultural
purposes).
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teenth and twentieth centuries, federal and state governments promoted the reclamation of wetlands to stimulate economic growth. 7
Not until the 1960s did the unique value and utility of wetlands
become apparent.8 Today, many view the destruction of wetlands
as contrary to public policy because wetlands are a "productive and
valuable public resource." 9
The Clean Water Act (CWA) and the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) protect wetlands and the ecosystems they support. 10 The CWA imposes substantive restrictions on agency action,
and NEPA imposes procedural requirements on agency action."
Section 404 of the CWA sets forth guidelines for "dredge and fill"
activities and delegates authority for their implementation to the
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).' 2 NEPA establishes guidelines for determining
when federal agencies must complete an environmental impact
3
statement (EIS).'
Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers14 is the most recent decision in a series of cases evaluating the process the Corps follows
when overseeing development within CWA and NEPA guidelines. 15
In Flowers, two environmental organizations opposed the Corps' is7. See Ausness, supra note 2, at 354-55 (noting federal, state reclamation of
wetlands).
8. See id. at 358-59 (acknowledging initial wetland regulations).
9. See 33 C.F.R. pt. 320.4(b) (1) (2005) (discussing why wetlands destruction is
contrary to public policy).
10. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 714 F. Supp. 539, 589 (D. Me. 1989) (acknowledging that CWA and NEPA protect wetlands).
11. See Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1273 (10th
Cir. 2004) (explaining functional difference between CWA and NEPA).
12. See Section 404 Overview, supra note 1 (indicating agencies involved in
CWA implementation). "[D]ischarge of dredged material means any addition of
dredged material into, including redeposit of dredged material other than incidental fallback within, the waters of the United States." 40 C.F.R. pt. 232.2 (2005).
Fill material is defined as "material placed in waters of the United States where the
material has the effect of replacing any portion of a water of the United States with
dry land or changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United
States." Id.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (2000) (requiring EIS when major federal action significantly affects "quality of the human environment").
14. 359 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2004).
15. See Utah Shared Access Alliance v. United States Forest Serv., 288 F.3d
1205, 1207 (10th Cir. 2002) (arguing Forest Service failed to take "hard look" at
environmental consequences of proposed plan); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n
v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2001) (examining decision not to complete EIS
for plan to increase vessel traffic in Glacier Bay, Alaska); Friends of the Earth v.
Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 1986) (determining whether Corps properly
determined that no practicable alternative existed to proposed fill of wetlands);
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District v. Norton, 294 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.
2002) (holding EIS was necessary).
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suance of a dredge and fill permit for a housing and golf course
development, citing the likely negative impact on the area wetlands,
a nearby river and bald eagles. 16 The Tenth Circuit held that the
Corps did not arbitrarily or capriciously issue a dredge and fill permit under the CWA.1 7 Additionally, the court held that the Corps
was not required to complete an EIS under NEPA.1 8
This Note discusses the Tenth Circuit's decision in Flowers.1 9
Section II summarizes the underlying facts and the relevant procedural history of Flowers.20 Section III discusses CWA and NEPA requirements and relevant case law. 21 Section IV of this Note

summarizes the Tenth Circuit's decision. 2 2 Section V critiques the
Flowers decision and asserts that although the Tenth Circuit properly decided the NEPA claims, it did not adequately consider the
environmental groups' CWA claims. 23 Finally, Section VI discusses
24
the impact this case has on national wetlands.
II.

FACTS

In 1994, the Edgcombs purchased the River Bend Ranch in
Snake River Canyon nearJackson, Wyoming. 25 The Ranch contains
26
wetlands and is situated near three bald eagle nesting territories.
In 2000, the Edgcombs sold 286 acres of the ranch to Canyon Club,
a development company, to construct an eighteen-hole golf course
27
and housing development.
16. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1269-70 (claiming that other alternatives may have
produced less adverse impacts on aquatic ecosystem).
17. See id. at 1273 (holding Corps' decision that proposal was least damaging
practicable alternative was neither arbitrary nor capricious).
18. See id. at 1257 (noting court's NEPA holding).
19. 359 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2004).
20. For a summary of Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers' facts, see infra
notes 25-53 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of CWA and NEPA requirements and relevant case law,
see infra notes 54-139 and accompanying text.
22. For an analysis of the Tenth Circuit's decision, see infra notes 140-59 and
accompanying text.
23. For a critique of the Flowersdecision, see infra notes 160-209 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of the case, see infra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
25. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1263 (discussing factual background). The River
Bend Ranch operates as a cattle ranch. See id.
26. See id. (discussing location of land). The Canyon Club property is part of
1,222-acres of private land. See id. Five hundred forty four acres of the River Bend
Ranch lie to the north of the Canyon Club property, and a 125-acre segment of the
Ranch lies to the south of the Canyon Club property. See id.
27. See id. (explaining to whom land was sold and intended development of
sold acreage). Mr. Edgcomb is Canyon Club's president and primary shareholder.
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Construction required the dredge and fill of wetlands on the
property and the positioning of structures, known as bendway weirs,
in the Snake River to prevent erosion. 2 8 To dredge and fill, Canyon
Club submitted an application to the Corps for a section 404 permit.29 Initially, the public opposed the project because of its possible effects on area bald eagles, its impact on the Snake River and its
noncompliance with land development regulations.3 0 To mitigate
these concerns, Canyon Club purchased additional acreage from
the Edgcombs to relocate some features of the development, bringing the total purchased land to 359 acres. 31 Canyon Club submitted a new proposal to the Corps requesting authorization to dredge
1.71 acres, fill 1.45 acres ofjurisdictional wetlands and place twelve
bendway weirs in the Snake River for construction purposes. 3 2
The Corps requested that Canyon Club submit three documents to assess the project's environmental impact.33 Pioneer Environmental Service (Pioneer), an environmental consulting firm,
completed the requested documents on Canyon Club's behalf: (1)
a biological assessment (BA); (2) an environmental assessment
(EA); and (3) a section 404(b) (1) analysis. 3 4 In its BA, Pioneer
See id. at 1262. For the Ranch to remain in operation, the Edgcombs needed the
earnings generated by the development. See id.
28. See id. (noting procedures necessary for construction of development).
Bendway weirs reduce flow velocities near the outer bank, thus reducing erosion of
the outer bank. See The Bendway Weir, http://chl.wes.army.mil/research/hydstruc/bankprotect/bendweir/work.htp (last visited Oct. 3, 2004).
29. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1263 (discussing original Canyon Club proposal).
This proposal requested authorization to fill 1.5 acres and dredge 2.75 acres of
jurisdictional wetlands. See id.
30. See id. at 1264 (discussing public opposition). The United States Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) expressed concern regarding the effects of the bendway
weirs on the Snake River. See id. at 1271, n.14. EPA noted that the "weirs may
cause channel migration or erosion downstream, on the opposite bank," or an
island located on this segment of the river. See id.
31. See id. at 1264 (noting solution to public opposition).
32. See id. (describing acres involved in dredging and filling). Of the 1.45
filled acres, .87 were for home site development, .06 for golf cart path construction, .43 for hole and tee construction, .08 for water feature construction and .01
for bendway weir construction. See id. The 1.71 dredged acres were for water feature construction. See id. In addition, the proposal described mitigating measures
such as a reconstructed pond, three new ponds, buried utility lines, conservation
easements and restrictive easements on incoming property owners. See id. at 126465.
33. See id. at 1265 (indicating Canyon Club's responsibility in assessing environmental impact).
34. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1265 (describing documents necessary in permit
application process). A BA is an examination of the possible effects of a project on
proposed, endangered or threatened species. See Glossary of Energy Terms, http:/
/egov.oregon.gov/energy/renew/glossary.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). An EA
is a document that evaluates the "significant environmental impacts" of a federal
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concluded that the proposed development was likely to adversely
affect area bald eagles, possibly causing the eagle pairs to desert
their nests. 35 In its EA and section 404(b) (1) analysis, Pioneer con-

cluded that the "proposed action is the least damaging practicable
36

on-site alternative.1

After examining the BA, the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS), in its consultation role with EPA, issued a biological
opinion (BiOp), stating that the proposed action was not likely to
threaten the bald eagle's existence as a species even if the three
pairs on the land were lost.3 7 Additionally, FWS issued an inciden-

tal take statement noting the expected loss of three nesting territories and the loss of twelve juvenile bald eagles. 38 Nevertheless, the

action. See id. The section 404(b) (1) guidelines emphasize the consideration of
practicable alternatives to the proposed activity, the impact of fill activity on wetlands and diminishing the effects of discharge on the wetlands. See Nathaniel Browand, Note, Shifting the Boundary Between the Sections 402 and 404 PermittingPrograms
by Expanding the Definition of Fill Material, 31 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 617, 623
(2004).
35. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1265 (explaining conclusion that construction and
amplified human presence would adversely impact bald eagles). The BA focused
on endangered species, particularly the bald eagle, taking into consideration construction activities and the increased presence of humans using the golf course
and residing in the housing development. See id. The Corps informed the public
that the land development would likely adversely affect bald eagles and sought
public opinion on the matter. See id. No one requested a public hearing. See id.
36. See id. at 1266-67 (explaining determination of other Pioneer documents).
In determining that no practicable alternative existed, Pioneer examined golf
course design requirements, land development regulations and the development's
purpose. See id. at 1266. The first was a no-action alternative, which Pioneer concluded would have a greater environmental impact because it may lead to the sale
of the entire Ranch and the development of a 250-house residential complex. See
id. This alternative, however, would have less impact on the bald eagles. See id. at
1267. The second alternative was a nine-hole golf course, which was also deemed
impracticable because the low demand for such a course would make it difficult to
generate finances needed to operate the course. See id. Also, it would result in
decreased value of the residences. See id. Next, Pioneer examined the original
286-acre proposal and the 286-acre proposal with the relocation of holes three and
four. See id. These alternatives did not comply with land development regulations.
See id. The analysis concluded the 359-acre proposal was "the least damaging practicable alternative that satisfies the project purpose." See id. at 1266. The Corps
analyzed whether other sites in the County could serve as locations for the proposed development. See id. at 1266-67. The Corps concluded each site would produce a comparable impact on wetlands and would result in an increased cost. See
id. at 1267.
37. See id. at 1265 (describing FWS's response to BA). The document further
noted because no bald eagle critical habitat was designated, none would be affected. See id.
38. See id. (noting particulars of incidental take statement).
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incidental take statement permitted the Corps to issue the permit,
provided that Canyon Club fulfilled various terms and conditions.3 9
On June 4, 2002, the Corps informed the FWS that Canyon
Club would receive the permit.40 Ten days later, the Corps issued
its official decision to grant the permit, designating the decision as
each of the following: the Corps' EA, public interest review, statement of findings and NEPA compliance determination. 4 1 The
Corps concurred with Pioneer's findings from the section
404(b) (1) analysis, which determined the 359-acre proposal was the
"least damaging practicable alternative. ' 42 Finally, the Corps determined that an EIS was unnecessary because the project would not
43
have a significant impact on the human environment.
Two environmental groups, the Greater Yellowstone Coalition
and the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance (Yellowstone), filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming,
challenging the Corps' decision to issue the dredge and fill permit.4 4 Yellowstone requested a temporary restraining order (TRO)

and a preliminary injunction to stop construction. 45 The district
court denied the injunction, stating that Yellowstone failed to show
irreparable harm to the bald eagles. 46 Following Yellowstone's appeal, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to consider other prongs of the preliminary injunction
test.4 7 The district court reconsidered the case, rejected Yellow-

39. .See id. (noting FWS's permission to grant permit). The terms and conditions specified Canyon Club must complete construction within two years, construction must be monitored to avoid activity within 400 meters of baby eagles'
nests and the effects of the project on eagle nests be strictly supervised during the
construction period and for five years thereafter. See id. Four months earlier, the
FWS responded to the Corps directly, suggesting the Corps deny the permit because of the development's "substantial and unacceptable impacts" on wildlife and
because alternatives had not yet been explored. See id. at 1265-66. FWS also recommended the Corps complete an EIS. See id. at 1266.
40. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1266 (noting time at which Corps decided to issue
dredge and fill permit). The Corps sent FWS copies of Pioneer's BA, EA and section 404(b) (1) analysis. See id.
41. See id. (noting official decision to grant permit). The Pioneer documents
were attached as appendices to the decision. See id.
42. See id. (observing Corps' agreement with analysis).
43. See id. at 1268 (explaining Corps decision that EIS is not required).
44. See id. (discussing procedural history).
45. See Rowers, 359 F.3d at 1268 (noting relief sought in district court).
46. See id. (explaining why district court denied Yellowstone's relief).
47. See id. (remanding to district court). See Greater Yellowstone Coalition v.
Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1262 (10th Cir. 2003) (remanding to district court to consider whether Yellowstone satisfied other factors of preliminary injunction test).
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stone's NEPA claims and upheld the Corps' issuance of the dredge
4

and fill permit.

3

Yellowstone again appealed to the Tenth Circuit, alleging that
the Corps' consideration of practicable alternatives failed to meet
CWA standards. 49 Yellowstone argued that the Corps ignored two
alternatives: (1) moving features of the golf course and housing development, which would avoid the dredge and fill of wetlands, the
construction of weirs in the Snake River and the adverse impact on
the bald eagles; and (2) reducing the number of home sites,
thereby possibly decreasing the development's wetland and bald eagle impact.5 0 Yellowstone further alleged that the Corps violated
NEPA by failing to complete an EIS regarding adverse effects on
the Snake River and the bald eagle. 5 1 The Tenth Circuit unanimously held that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
issuing the section 404(b) permit under the CWA.52 The court fur-

ther held that the Corps properly concluded an EIS was unneces53
sary under NEPA.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

Clean Water Act
1.

Requirements

In 1972, Congress passed the CWA, a keystone of the federal
environmental protection program. 5 4 The CWA's objective is to
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. " 55 To reach this objective, section
404(a) of the CWA sets forth guidelines for dredge and fill activities
and delegates to the Corps and EPA implementation of dredge and
56
fill discharge into "navigable waters," which includes wetlands.
48. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1268 (noting final decision of district court).
49. See id. (appealing to Tenth Circuit).
50. See id. at 1269 (advancing alternatives to decrease environmental impact).
51. See id. at 1262-63 (noting Yellowstone's arguments).
52. See id. at 1273 (upholding Corps' decision to issue dredge and fill permit).
53. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1277 (holding EIS was unnecessary).
54. See Michael M. Meloy, Article, Dispute Resolution Symposium: Resolving Disputes Arising Out of the ChangingFace of Agriculture: Challenges Presented by Law, Science, and Public Perceptions, 10 PENN. ST. ENVTrL. L. REv. 249, 255 (2002) (noting
when Congress passed CWA).
55. See Debra Alise Spungin, Troubled Waters: Florida'sIsolated Wetlands in the
Aftermath of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers, 26 NovA L. REv. 371, 374 (2001) (discussing CWA's objective).
56. See Section 404 Overview, supra note 1 (indicating agencies involved in
CWA implementation).
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The CWA permit process may include notifying the public of
the planned discharge, preparing an EIS and ensuring compliance
with EPA's guidelines. 5 7 EPA's section 404 guidelines provide that
discharge activity may be permitted if four criteria are met: (1) no
practicable alternatives exist; (2) there is no considerable degradation to United States' waters; (3) reasonable mitigation efforts are
exercised; and (4) no statutory violations occur. 58 The Flowers opinion, in relevant part, focused on the practicable alternatives
59
criterion.
The practicable alternatives guideline has generated significant discussion among the federal courts. 60 This guideline provides
that: "no discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted if
there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which
would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as
the alternative does not have other significant adverse environmental impacts. ' 61 In determining whether a practicable alternative is
available, the Corps' burden is heaviest for non-water dependent
projects planned for wetland areas. 6 2 The presumption is that practicable alternatives not involving wetlands exist, and this presumption holds unless "clearly demonstrated otherwise." 63 If no
practicable alternatives exist, the CWA requires the Corps to consider ways to mitigate wetland impact. 64 Mitigation includes avoid-

57. See Ausness, supra note 2, at 366 (reviewing permit process).
58. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10(a), (c), (d), and (b)) (noting EPA
guidelines for discharge activity).
59. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1269 (considering alternatives under CWA).
60. See, e.g., Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 882 F.2d 407, 409
(9th Cir. 1989) (discussing role of project purpose, cost and logistics in determining whether practicable alternative exists); Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74, 84
(Mass. Dist. Ct. 1982) (concluding defendant failed to show practicable alternatives did not exist); see also Robert Uram, The Evolution of the PracticableAlternatives
Test, 7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 15 (1992) (conducting in-depth analysis of practicable alternatives test).
61. 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10(a) (2005) (allowing dredge and fill only if there is no
practicable alternative). A practicable alternative is defined as being "available and
capable of being done after taking into consideration cost, existing technology and
logistics in light of overall project purposes." Id. at 230.10(a) (2) (defining practicable alternative).
62. See Holy Cross Wilderness Fund v. Madigan, 960 F.2d 1515, 1524 (10th
Cir. 1992) (noting increased burden when project is not water dependent).
63. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10(a) (3) (discussing presumption for non-water dependent projects).
64. See Bhavani Prasad V. Nerikar, Comment, This Wetland is Your Land, This
Wetland is My Land: Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and its Impact on the Private
Development of Wetlands, 4 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 197, 211 (1990) (discussing
mitigation).
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ing, minimizing or compensating for losses. 65 The Council on

Environmental Quality and NEPA guide the Corps and the EPA in
66
determining what constitutes mitigation.
2. Relevant Case Law
The following cases concern the Corps' responsibility in determining whether a practicable alternative to a proposed project exists. 67

These cases establish two propositions:

(1)

appropriate

techniques must be employed to minimize any adverse effects if an
adverse environmental impact, such as the fill of wetlands, cannot
be avoided; 68 and (2) the Corps is not obligated to replicate an indepth analysis if an agency, EPA for example, conducts any such
69
analysis of practicable alternatives.
a. Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice'
In Rice, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether the Corps acted arbitrarily or capriciously in granting a permit to fill seventyfour acres of wetlands, known as Walton Tract, for a landfill. 7 1 The
appellants, representing several environmental groups (the Fund),
argued that the Corps erred in failing to choose an alternative site
with less adverse wetland impact.7 2 The Eleventh Circuit held that
65. See 33 C.F.R. pt. 320.4(r) (discussing mitigation role in permit application
process).
66. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.20(a)-(e) (2005)). Mitigation includes:
(a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts
of an action.
(b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its implementation.
(c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment.
(d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and
maintenance operations during the life of the action.
(e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources or environments.
40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.20 (a)-(e).
67. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 541 (11th Cir. 1996)
(examining whether Corps considered practicable alternatives).
68. See id. at 544 (applying mitigation standard set forth in 40 C.F.R. pt.
230.10(d)).
69. See Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438,
1447 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding Corps is not obligated to repeat analysis under 40
C.F.R. pt. 230.10(a)).
70. 85 F.3d 535 (l1th Cir. 1996).
71. See id. at 541 (noting issue).
72. See id. at 542 (noting Fund's argument).
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the Corps properly granted a permit to fill seventy-four acres of wetlands in conjunction with the landfill construction. 73
Of the four proposed sites, the county least favored Walton
Tract.7 4 The Eleventh Circuit stated that the Corps was not bound
by the county's determination of the propriety of Walton Tract as
the landfill site. 75 The Corps determined that Walton Tract was the
most suitable site because each alternative posed its own environmental problems. 76 The court concluded that the Corps properly

adhered to the CWA's sequencing preference regarding avoidance,
minimization and compensatory mitigation in determining that
77
Walton Tract was the most suitable site.
Under the avoidance provision, the Eleventh Circuit noted the
Corps' determination that no site entirely avoided wetland impact. 78 In examining the second provision, the court concluded,

because wetland fill was unavoidable, steps should have been taken
to minimize the adverse impacts. 79 It noted that the county minimized the adverse consequences by reducing the impact on the wetlands from 120 to seventy-four acres. 80 Under the compensatory
mitigation provision, the court observed that the county planned to
replace the lost wetlands with wet prairie habitat and to restore ex-

73. See id. at 544 (stating court's holding). The Fund sought to prevent the
construction of a landfill, claming the area was "an indispensable habitat" for the
Florida Panther and Indigo Snake. See id. at 538. Sarasota County, the entity proposing construction of the landfill, submitted a proposal that included four alternative sites for the landfill. See id. at 539. The FWS issued a BiOp, concluding the
landfill was unlikely to affect the panther and indigo snake, but nevertheless included recommendations that included a monitoring program. See id.
74. See id. at 543 (discussing environmental scores of proposed alternatives).
In the county's ranking system, Walton Tract received the lowest environmental
score. See id. If a site received a higher score, it was more suited for the landfill.
See id. The scores were as follows: Site D scored 39 points; Site E scored 39 points;
Site F (Walton Tract) scored 34 points; and Site G scored 41 points. See id.
75. See id. (concluding Corps is not obligated to follow county's ranking system). The court further noted the Corps' independent analysis requires a balancing of the applicant's need and environmental concerns and is not subject to
numerical precision. See id.
76. See Rice, 85 F.3d at 543 (discussing result of Corps' analysis of practicable
alternatives). For example, if the Corps chose Site D, it would result in the filling
of eighteen additional wetlands than if the Corps chose the Walton Tract. See id.
77. See id. (applying 33 C.F.R. pt. 320.4(r) and 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10).
78. See id. (acknowledging Corps determination under avoidance standard).
79. See id. at 544 (applying 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10(d)).
80. See id. (noting minimization efforts).
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isting wetlands. 81 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
82
Corps properly granted the permit.
b.

Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of
3
Engineers8

In Norfolk, the First Circuit reviewed a decision to issue a permit
for construction of a landfill.8 4 The court addressed whether the
Corps failed to adequately consider practicable alternatives to the
proposed site.8 5 In its Record of Decision (ROD), the Corps determined that the impact on the aquatic ecosystem would be inconsequential considering the negligible impact on nearby water supplies
86
and wetlands.
The appellants, the towns of Norfolk and Walpole (Towns),
argued that the CWA required the Corps to conduct an "exhaustive
feasibility evaluation" of all alternative sites initially proposed for
the landfill. 87 The First Circuit held that, because two other agencies conducted exhaustive analyses of other sites and the record
supported the Corps' conclusion that no practicable alternatives existed with less adverse environmental consequences, the Corps was
not required to duplicate any of these analyses. 8
The First Circuit relied on section 404, noting that the level of
review depends on the nature and gravity of the project's anticipated environmental impact.8 9 The court observed that EPA and
the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) each completed an extensive analysis of the alternative sites. 90 The court further noted that the administrative record supported the Corps'
finding that filling the 600 square foot artificial wetland negligibly
impacted the aquatic ecosystem. 9 1 The court held that the Corps
81. See Rice, 85 F.3d at 544 (discussing mitigation techniques).
82. See id. (concluding Corps properly granted permit). The court stated that
the Corps, FWS and EPA analyzed the project for five years and all agreed Walton
Tract was the most suitable site. See id.
83. 968 F.2d 1438 (1st Cir. 1992).
84. See id. at 1442 (noting decision before court). The fill activity, approved
by EPA and the FWS, involved filling a 600 square foot area of wetlands. See id. at
1443.
85. See id. at 1446 (noting issue).
86. See id. (noting Corps' determination in ROD).
87. See id. at 1447 (noting Town response to ROD). There were 299 alternative sites initially proposed. See id.
88. See Norfolk, 968 F.2d at 1447 (holding Corps' decision to issue dredge and
fill permit was not arbitrary or capricious).
89. See id. (stating town rigidly interpreted CWA guidelines).
90. See id. at 1443 (recognizing effort of agencies in alternative site analysis).
91. See id. at 1447 (stating administrative record supports Corps' decision).
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was not required to duplicate any of the analyses. 92 It rejected the
Towns' "dogmatic scrutiny" of the CWA guidelines and concluded
that the Corps was not responsible for conducting an analysis of
every site simply because the Towns disagreed with the specified
93
designation of the landfill site.
c.

Summary of CWA Case Law

CWA case law provides that the Corps may not issue a dredge
and fill permit if there is a practicable alternative that does not have
other significant adverse consequences. 94 Although this requirement must be met, the level of documentation varies to reflect the
seriousness of the activity. 95 The case law reasons that, although

the Corps is not required to examine every practicable alternative,
an environmental agency, such as EPA, must do so. 96 Furthermore,
discussing mitigation is appropriate where each alternative poses its
own environmental risks and adverse environmental impacts can97
not be avoided.
B.

National Environmental Policy Act
1. Requirements

Since its inception in 1969, NEPA has been "a pillar of environmental law."98 NEPA aims to assure that all governmental branches
properly consider environmental effects before undertaking "major
federal action that significantly affects the environment."' 99 NEPA
92. See id. (concluding Corps not required to conduct further analyses). The
court noted the Corps supplemented the other agencies findings by reevaluating
other sites to ensure the accuracy of the previous analyses. See id. at 1448. The
Corps concluded many of the sites did not meet the landfill requirements and
other sites were less preferable than the chosen site. See id.
93. See Norfolk, 968 F.2d at 1447-48 (rejecting Towns' request that Corps independently evaluate alternative sites).
94. See id. at 1446 (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10(a)) (discussing practicable alternatives).
95. See id. at 1447 (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.6(a) & (b)) (noting documentation
requirements).
96. See id. (concluding Corps is not obligated to duplicate analysis of EPA in
determining practicable alternatives).
97. See Fund for Animals v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 543-44 (11th Cir. 1996) (determining no practicable alternative with less adverse environmental impact existed).
98. See T.B. Tripp & Nathan G. Alley, StreamliningNEPA's EnvironmentalReview
Process: SuggestionsforAgency Reform, 12 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 74, 75 (2003) (introducing NEPA as fundamental federal statute).
99. See National Environmental Policy Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969),
available at http://www.epa.gov/region5/defs/html/nepa.htm (outlining NEPA's
policy).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol16/iss2/2

12

Doherty:
Denying
the Environment a Stay of Execution Is Par for the Course
DENYING
THE ENVIRONMENT A STAY OF EXECUTION

2005]

195

requires an EIS "for major federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment."' 100
When determining the "significance" of the impact on the
human environment, agencies must consider both context and intensity. 10 1 NEPA provides that agencies should consider the following factors in evaluating intensity: (1) the extent to which the
impact on the human environment will be highly controversial; (2)
the extent to which the project's impacts are unknown; and (3) the
extent to which the activity may impact critical habitats or endangered species. 10 2 An EA is a tool that aids in evaluating these factors. 10

3

The agency may also consider mitigation techniques when

determining whether an EIS is necessary. 10 4 If the agency determines that the project will not significantly impact the human environment, it issues a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).05
If, however, the activity will significantly affect the human environ10 6
ment, the agency is required to complete an EIS.
2.

Relevant Case Law

The subsequent cases concern an agency's responsibility in
completing an EIS under NEPA. 10 7 These cases advance three propositions: (1) if a document, an EA for example, states that the effects of a proposed action are attainable through further studies, an
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.27 (stating when EIS is necessary). Federal action includes "actions approved by permit or other regulatory
decision [s]." See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.18(b) (4). The human environment includes
"the natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with that
environment." See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.14.
101. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.27 (requiring considerations of context and intensity). Context "delimits the scope of the agency's actions, including the interest
affected. Intensity relates to the degree to which the agency action affects the
locale and interests identified in the context part of the inquiry." Nat'l Parks and
Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 731 (9th Cir. 2001).
102. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.27(b) (4), (5), (9) (identifying factors to consider
in determining environmental impact of proposed activity).
103. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.9(a) (explaining EA's function in NEPA context).
"An EA is a 'less formal and less rigorous' document than an EIS." Nat'l Parks, 241
F.3d at 728 (quoting Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988)) (noting difference in formalities between EA and EIS).
104. See Friends of the Payette v. Horseshoe Bend Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d
989, 993 (9th Cir. 1993) (indicating role of mitigation techniques).
105. See Nat'l Parks, 241 F.3d at 730 (discussing steps taken when agency finds
no significant impact on human environment).
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (requiring EIS if activity significantly affects
human environment).
107. See generally Nat'l Parks, 241 F.3d 722 (addressing whether action to increase tourism required EIS).
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EIS is necessary;10 8 (2) if there is sufficient controversy regarding
the proposed action's effects amounting to more than a disagreement between experts, an EIS is necessary; 10 9 and (3) courts consider mitigation efforts in determining whether a proposed action
will significantly affect the environment 10
a. NationalParks and Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt'"
In National Parks, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the proposed activity would significantly affect the human environment, requiring an EIS. 1 2 Endeavoring to increase tourism in Glacier Bay,
the National Parks Service (Parks Service) developed a vessel plan
to increase the number of cruise ships in the area by thirty percent."13 The Ninth Circuit held that an EIS was necessary because
the EA contained many uncertainties and controversy surrounded
14
the proposed plan."
First, although the EA stated that the activity's effects were unknown, the document indicated that the unknown information was
attainable through further studies and would be helpful in determining the environmental impact."15 Second, further uncertainty
existed because the Parks Service's EA reflected doubt as to
whether the mitigation techniques were effective and sufficiently related to the effects they were designed to alleviate.1 1 6 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that because the effects were attainable through
108. See id. at 732 (requiring EIS if effects of proposed action are attainable
through further studies).
109. See id. at 736 (requiring EIS if action is controversial).
110. See Friendsof Payette v. HorseshoeBend HydroelectricCo., 988 F.2d 989, 993-94
(9th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging mitigation techniques in concluding EIS was

unnecessary).
111. 241 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2001).
112. See id. at 730 (noting issue).
113. See id. at 726 (describing proposed project).
114. See id. at 739 (noting court's holding). In assessing the environmental
impact, the Parks Service furnished an EA noting the effects of the proposed activity, but repeatedly stated the extent of the effects were unknown. See id. at 728-29.
The court based its decision on statutory considerations such as the unique characteristics of the area; the degree to which the proposed activity's effects were uncertain; and the degree of controversy surrounding the proposed activity. See id. at

731.
115. See id. at 732-33 (explaining why EIS is necessary). The court stated that
the EA, where the agency's defense of the action is found, is undermined when it

lacks data. See id. at 732. Consequently, the court maintained the Parks Service

failed to take a "hard look" as NEPA requires. See id. at 733.
116. See Nat'l Parks, 241 F.3d at 734 (explaining additional reason for uncertainty). The EA stated that various mitigation techniques could mitigate some environmental harm, but the document lacked any substantial certainty. See id. at
735.
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further studies and an agency must reasonably develop mitigation
1 17
techniques, an EIS was necessary.
Finally, the court concluded that sufficient controversy existed
to require an EIS.118 Following the EA's publication, the Parks Service received 450 comments, eighty-five percent of which opposed
the chosen alternative and favored a different one. 119 The public
protested the Parks Service's uncertainty about the activity's effect
and the mitigation techniques' sufficiency. 120 Although the Parks
Service stated it would implement the vessel plan and then study its
that this solution was inadeeffects, the Ninth Circuit concluded
12 1
quate to resolve the controversy.
b.

Friends of Payette v. Horseshoe Bend Hydroelectric Co.

122

In Horseshoe Bend, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the
Corps violated NEPA by issuing a dredge and fill permit without
completing an EIS. 12 3 The controversy arose when Horseshoe
Bend Hydroelectric Company (HBHC) applied for a dredge and
fill permit to construct a hydroelectric facility on the Payette River
near Horseshoe Bend, Indiana. 124 The Corps determined that an
EIS was unnecessary because the proposed activity would not significantly impact the environment.' 25 The appellants, Friends of Payette and Idaho Rivers United (Friends of Payette), disagreed with
the Corps' assessment. 126 The court held that the Corps appropriately decided not to issue an EIS. 127 In reaching this conclusion,
See id. at 732-34 (concluding EIS was necessary due to uncertainties).
See id. at 736 (noting court's decision regarding controversy).
See id. (discussing outpouring of public protest). As the court stated,
lay the controversy." See id. at 737.
120. See id. (explaining reason for public protest).
121. See Nat'l Parks, 241 F.3d at 737 (stating Parks Service response to controversy was not adequate to resolve controversy).
122. 988 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 2003).
123. See id. at 991 (noting issue in case).
124. See id. (noting activity in dispute). The plan involved utilization of a canal, which previously contained wetlands. See id. at 992. After completing an EA,
HBHC obtained necessary state and federal permits. See id. After acquiring those
permits, HBHC petitioned the Corps for a dredge and fill permit. See id. (discussing sequence of events).
125. See id. (noting Corps' decision regarding EIS). Instead, the Corps issued
an EA and a FONSI. See id. The Corps conceded the activity constituted a major
federal action. See id. Therefore, the court's role was to decide whether the Corps
properly concluded the activity would not significantly affect the environment. See
id. (referring to requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 4332).
126. See id. at 991 (noting dispute in case).
127. See Horseshoe Bend, 988 F.2d at 993 (upholding Corps' decision not to
issue EIS).
117.
118.
119.
"therein
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the Ninth Circuit focused on the mitigation techniques included in
128
the permit.
Friends of Payette first claimed that the Corps erroneously concluded the proposed activity would not significantly affect the wetlands. 129 The court disagreed, noting a mitigation plan to create
66.64 acres of new wetlands. 130 Second, Friends of Payette claimed
the proposed activity would adversely affect fish.' 3 ' The court rejected this claim and recognized the Corps' plan to counteract the
anticipated loss of fish through specified mitigation measures. 32
Finally, Friends of Payette claimed that the Corps did not evaluate
the activity's impact on bald eagles. 33 Again, the Ninth Circuit
noted the mitigation measures the Corps and the FWS set forth.13 4
The Corps had conditioned the permit on the implementation of
various mitigation techniques to monitor and, if necessary, enhance
35
the status of the eagle habitat.'
c.

Summary of NEPA Case Law

Relevant case law establishes that courts consider the factors set
forth in the NEPA guidelines for determining whether an action
may significantly affect the environment. 13 6 These factors include
examining: (1) the extent to which the effects are highly uncertain;
(2) the level of controversy surrounding the proposed activity; and
128. See id. at 993-94 (acknowledging role of mitigating techniques on environmental impact). The court acknowledged that mitigation measures need not
completely compensate for harmful environmental impacts. See id. at 993 (citing
Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir. 1982)).
129. See id. (noting wetland impact argument).
130. See id. (discussing plan to mitigate wetland impact). Grass seeding, tree
and shrub planting and water channels would create the new wetlands. See id.
Absent a mitigation plan, 30.99 acres of wetlands would be destroyed, as compared
to the loss of 24.69 acres with a plan. See id. If the goals of the mitigation plan
were not met, there was a separate plan involving monitoring and supplemental
mitigation. See id.
131. See id. at 993-94 (rejecting Friends of Payette's second claim).
132. See Horseshoe Bend, 988 F.2d at 993-94 (recognizing plan to mitigate for
loss of fish). The mitigation measures included an enhanced monitoring plan,
further mitigation measures if original measures were not sufficient and a plan to
improve fish habitat in a nearby creek. See id. at 994 (discussing mitigation
techniques).
133. See id. at 993-94 (noting appellants' other claim).
134. See id. (looking at measures to mitigate harm to bald eagles).
135. See id. at 994 (discussing mitigation measures to protect bald eagles).
Moreover, the court noted the existence of other riparian zones that could serve as
eagle habitats. See id.
136. See, e.g., Nat'l Parks and Conversation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 731
(9th Cir. 2001) (discussing factors in determining significance as set forth in 40
C.F.R. pt. 1508.27).
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(3) the extent to which the activity may adversely affect a
threatened species.13 7 Additionally, in determining whether an EIS
is necessary, the court may consider the role of mitigation techniques. 138 An EIS is necessary if the proposed activity will signifi39
cantly affect the human environment.
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In Rowers, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the Corps' documentation regarding practicable alternatives and determined that the
Corps' assessment accorded with CWA guidelines.' 40 The court rejected Yellowstone's arguments that the Corps failed to provide
clear and convincing evidence that no practicable alternative existed, and that Canyon Club ignored obvious alternatives.1 4 ' In response to Yellowstone's NEPA claims, the court concluded that the
Corps could have justifiably found that various mitigation techniques rendered the bald eagle impact "so minor" that an EIS was
unnecessary.142
A.

Alternatives Under the CWA

The Tenth Circuit held that it was unnecessary for the Corps to
consider the other alternatives Yellowstone advanced because the
Corps' analysis contained adequate documentation given the activity's expected impact.' 4 3 The court recognized that, in order to
meet the project's basic purpose, Canyon Club needed to optimize
the quantity of land for the project without compromising the viability of the remaining land as a working ranch.144 The Tenth Circuit concluded that even though none of the alternatives
contemplated whether more acreage could be devoted to the pro137. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.27 (setting forth intensity factors).
138. See Horseshoe Bend, 988 F.2d at 993 (discussing role of mitigation in determining whether EIS is necessary).
139. See id. at 992 (indicating when EIS is necessary as set forth in 40 C.F.R.
pt. 1508.27).
140. See Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1271 (10th Cir.
2004) (applying 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.6(b)).
141. See id. at 1269 (highlighting Yellowstone's argument).
142. See id. at 1276 (deciding Corps was justified in concluding EIS was
unnecessary).
143. See id. at 1270 (applying 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.6(b) in concluding Corps was
not required to consider other alternatives because its analysis contained sufficient
level of documentation). The Corps also advanced the argument that it was not
required to explore Yellowstone's alternatives because they did not serve the project's purpose, which was to preserve the Ranch as a cattle ranch. See id. The court
rejected this argument. See id.
144. See id. at 1271 (noting steps taken to satisfy project's purpose).
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ject without compromising the ranch's viability, this oversight alone
did not render the Corps' decision arbitrary or capricious because
the Corps' level of documentation adhered to the CWA
14 5
guidelines.
Specifically, the court noted that the section 404 analysis detailed the discharge's effect on the aquatic ecosystem and acknowl1 46
edged that any alternative would negatively affect the bald eagles.
The court stated that even Yellowstone's alternatives would not adequately address this problem because the record indicated that any
development would adversely impact the bald eagles.' 47 Moreover,
the court concluded that the analysis was sufficient because it addressed issues that concerned Yellowstone, including the advantages of the bendway weirs and the creation and enhancement of

wetlands. 148 Considering the above, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the Corps' level of documentation and its designation of the
359-acre proposal as the least damaging practicable alternative were
149
neither arbitrary nor capricious.
B.

EIS Preparation Under NEPA

In analyzing Yellowstone's NEPA claim, the Tenth Circuit relied on NEPA guidelines, which aid in determining whether an action will significantly affect the environment. 5 0 The court focused
on the controversy surrounding the project's possible effects, the
uncertainty of those effects and the adverse impact on a threatened
species. 15 ' The court noted that, while EPA and the FWS raised
concerns about the effect of the weirs, those concerns did not decrease the reasonableness of the Corps' decision.' 52 Moreover,
even though the Corps concluded that the weirs would not signifi145. See Fowers, 359 F.3d at 1271 (concluding oversight does not render deci-

sion arbitrary or capricious). In a hearing before the district court, Mr. Edgcomb
testified that committing more land to the development would destroy the Ranch's
viability. See id. at n.13. Nevertheless, that statement was not part of the record
before the Tenth Circuit. See id.
146. See id. at 1271-72 (noting section 404 analysis included detailed factual
determinations).
147. See id. at 1273 (acknowledging Yellowstone's alternatives did not reduce
overall bald eagle impact).
148. See id. at 1271 (noting discussion of improvements resulting from activity). Although EPA feared the weirs would cause harm, the court concluded the
Corps can rely on its own experts, provided the decision is neither arbitrary nor
capricious. See id. at n.14
149. See id. at 1273 (setting forth court's holding).
150. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1276 (relying on NEPA guidelines).
151. See id. (specifying factors on which court relies).
152. See id. at 1275 (noting that disagreement existed).
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cantly affect the river, it adopted mitigation techniques in case its
15 3
decision proved incorrect.
Next, the court addressed Yellowstone's argument that the
bald eagle impact necessitated an EIS.1 54 Relying on the uncertain
effects portion of the NEPA guidelines, the court concluded that an
EIS would not assist in determining the project's impact on the
bald eagles. 155 The court recognized that the uncertain effects on
the bald eagles stemmed from the species' inconsistent reactions to
human development. 15 6 Furthermore, the court explained that an
anticipated loss of some members of a threatened species did not
57
automatically require an EIS.1
Finally, in looking at the adverse impact provision of the NEPA
guidelines, the Tenth Circuit emphasized the use of mitigation
techniques to offset the environmental impact of the project. 158
The court stated that the Corps' finding that the mitigation techniques serve as an adequate buffer between the golf course and
housing development and the bald eagles was reasonable. 159
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Tenth Circuit allowed the Corps' violation of the CWA
guidelines to stand. 160 The court focused on a portion of Yellowstone's practicable alternatives argument, ignoring its argument
concerning the possible beneficial effects the other alternatives may
have on the nearby wetlands. 16 1 The court did, however, properly
153. See id. (recognizing Corps made provisions in case its decision regarding
weirs was incorrect).
154. See id. at 1275-77 (discussing preparation of EIS in correlation with bald
eagle impact).
155. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1276 (acknowledging EIS would not assist in determining bald eagle impact).
156. See id. (stating why EIS would not prove helpful).
157. See id. (concluding that greater evidence than loss of some members of
threatened species is needed before EIS will be required). Moreover, there was
uncertainty as to how the bald eagles would react to the development, making an
EIS futile. See id.
158. See id. (acknowledging mitigation techniques). The techniques included
daily monitoring of active bald eagle nests, cessation of construction if bald eagles
were harmed and the continuation of mitigation for five years after construction
ceases. See id.
159. See id. at 1277 (concluding Corps' decision regarding EIS was neither
arbitrary nor capricious).
160. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1273 (upholding Corps' decision that proposal
was least damaging practicable alternative).
161. See id. (focusing on Yellowstone's argument that alternatives would reduce bald eagle impact).
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conclude that the Corps did not violate NEPA by determining that
162
an EIS was unnecessary.
A.

CWA Practicable Alternatives

The Tenth Circuit improperly found that the Corps complied
163
with the CWA guidelines in considering practicable alternatives.
The court gave cursory consideration to Yellowstone's argument
that the Corps should have considered whether other alternatives
would have had less adverse impact on nearby wetlands. 164 Instead,
the court focused on, and properly rejected, Yellowstone's argument that the alternatives may decrease bald eagle impact. 165 In
ignoring the former argument, the Tenth Circuit allowed the Corps
to bypass considering a potential practicable alternative with less
wetland impact. 166 Its decision, therefore, does not coincide with
167
CWA requirements.
Flowers is distinguishable from the First Circuit's decision in
Norfolk, which held that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capri1 68
ciously in issuing a permit to fill a 600 foot artificial wetland.
First, in Norfolk, the Towns did not dispute the Corps' findings that
the area had "virtually no function or value."' 69 Furthermore, the
Towns did not produce any evidence that the wetland had ecological value. 170 Unlike the area in Norfolk, the Canyon Club area supports bald eagles, moose, elk, mountain lions and other species,
17
making it ecologically valuable. '
Second, the Norfolk court recognized that although the Corps
failed to conduct an independent analysis of the 299 alternative
162. See id. at 1276 (concluding EIS would be unproductive and mitigation
techniques are adequate to protect bald eagle impact).
163. See id. at 1273 (concluding Corps' CWA analysis was proper).
.164. See id. (examining documents regarding bald eagle impact).
165. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1273 (indicating that although Yellowstone's alternatives may incrementally decrease bald eagle impact, they are insignificant comparative to eagle impact of whole development).
166. See id. at 1269 (noting, but not discussing, Yellowstone's argument that

alternatives may decrease wetland impact).
167. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10 (setting forth practicable alternatives re-

quirement).
168. See Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Engrs, 968 F.2d 1438,
1448 (lst Cir. 1992) (holding it was neither arbitrary nor capricious for Corps to

conclude practicable alternative with less adverse environmental consequences did
not exist).
169. See id. at 1447 (discussing wetland value).
170. See id. (noting Towns never asserted wetland had ecological value).
171. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1263 (recognizing value of Canyon Club property
to various species).
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landfill sites, EPA and the MWATRA did conduct analyses. 172 In Flowers, the court focused on the bald eagle impact, and gave no indication that the Corps or any other agency examined whether
Yellowstone's alternatives would less adversely affect area wetlands. 173 The CWA provides that if a practicable alternative with
less environmental impact on the aquatic ecosystem exists, the
Corps may not issue a permit. 174 Ostensibly, if any of Yellowstone's
alternatives would avoid the dredge and fill of some wetlands, that
alternative would have a less adverse impact on the aquatic
175
ecosystem.
The Flowers decision is also distinguishable from the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Rice based on the facts of each case and the
application of the CWA. 176 In Rice, the Fund alleged the Corps violated the CWA by failing to choose an alternative with less adverse
wetland impact. 177 In Flowers, Yellowstone argued that the Corps
violated the CWA by failing to even consider alternatives with less
adverse impact on the wetlands, the bald eagles and the Snake
River. 1 78 In Rice, the Corps determined that each alternative proposed by the Fund had other significant adverse environmental
consequences for the wetlands and that the chosen site had envi179
ronmental advantages.
This decision accords with the CWA, which states that the
Corps shall not issue a permit if there is a practicable alternative
with less adverse environmental impact, unless the alternative has
other adverse environmental impacts.18 0 The Flowers decision
avoided any discussion as to whether Yellowstone's proposed alternatives would have other adverse environmental impacts on the

172. See Norfolk, 968 F.2d at 1447 (indicating conducted analysis of alternatives
was sufficient).
173. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1270-73 (explaining various analyses regarding
Yellowstone's practicable alternatives and their effect on bald eagles).
174. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10(a) (discussing practicable alternatives).
175. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1269-70 (alleging Corps failed to consider practicable alternatives with less potential impact on wetlands).
176. See Fundfor Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 543 (11th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging no alternative had less adverse impact on aquatic ecosystem).
177. See id. at 542 (noting Fund's argument).
178. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1269-70 (noting Yellowstone's argument).
179. See Rice, 85 F.3d at 543-54 (discussing alternative's adverse environmental
impacts). One environmental advantage was that the Walton Tract was large
enough to provide an adequate buffer around the sides of the landfill. See id. at
544.
180. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10(a) (describing under what circumstances Corps
may issue dredge and fill permit).
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wetlands or whether the chosen alternative produced advantages
for the wetlands."8 '
Furthermore, the Rice court properly discussed the role of
avoidance, minimization and compensatory mitigation as set forth
in the CWA. i8 2 In contrast, the Rowers court disregarded the first
two considerations and focused on mitigation efforts.18 3 This reasoning is improper, however, because in the context of the CWA,
the Corps should consider mitigation techniques, as the Rice court
did, after determining that no practicable alternative exists. 18 4 As
the Rice court stated, the CWA's regulatory requirements cannot be
ignored because of the mitigation potential of the chosen alternative.' 8 5 In sum, the Flowers decision is inconsistent with the Rice decision because there is no evidence that Yellowstone's alternatives
had their own adverse environmental impacts. 8 6 Furthermore, the
Flowers court discussion of mitigation techniques was misplaced in
87
the CWA context.'
B.

EIS Preparation Under NEPA
1.

Highly ControversialFactor

The Tenth Circuit's decision is consistent with prior decisions
regarding the amount of controversy that would necessitate an
EIS. l8 8 In its analysis of the controversy surrounding the Canyon
Club project, the Tenth Circuit properly distinguished the facts in
Flowersfrom those in National Parks.'8 9 In National Parks, eighty-five
percent of the comments the Parks Service received expressed op181. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1273 (noting only that Yellowstone's alternatives
might have other adverse environmental consequences for bald eagle).
182. See Rice, 85 F.3d at 543-44 (setting forth CWA standards).
183. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1273 (recognizing efforts to minimize adverse
bald eagle impact).
184. See Nerikar, supranote 64, at 211 (indicating Corps should consider mitigation after it concludes no practicable alternative exists); see also, Thomas J.
Schoenbaum & Richard B. Stewart, The Role of Mitigation and Conservation Measures
in Achieving Compliance With Environmental Regulatory Statutes: Lessons From Section
316 of the Clean Water Act, 8 N.Y.U. ENvnL. L.J. 237, 253 (2000) (stating agency
cannot use mitigation to reduce environmental impacts during least damaging
practicable evaluation).
185. See Rice, 85 F.3d at 544 (discussing role of mitigation in considering practicable alternatives).
186. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1269-73 (discussing Yellowstone's alternatives).
187. See Nerikar, supra note 64, at 211 (discussing role of mitigation).
188. See Nat'l Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 736-37 (9th
Cir. 2001) (discussing level of controversy in response to proposed action).
189. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1275 (distinguishing Nat'l Parks).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol16/iss2/2

22

2005]

Doherty:
Denying the Environment a Stay of Execution Is Par for the Course
DENYING THE ENVIRONMENT A STAY OF EXECUTION

205

position to the proposed plan. 190 Conversely, in Flowers, EPA raised
"general concerns" about the weirs' impact, and the Forest Service
disagreed with the findings published in a report about the design
19 1
and function of the weirs.
Unlike the "outpouring of public protest" in NationalParks, the
192
dispute in Flowers is characterized as a dispute between experts.
This distinction supports the Flowers decision because, although the
Corps cannot clear the "outpouring of public protest" hurdle, it can
rely on its own expert. 193 If the Corps chooses to rely on its own
expert and other experts disagree, the dispute is not a controversy
sufficient to require an EIS. 194 The Flowers court thus properly
noted that the disagreement regarding the bendway weirs was not
19 5
sufficiently controversial to require an EIS.
2.

Uncertain Effects Standard

The Flowers court properly distinguished National Parks under
NEPA's "highly uncertain" factor in determining significance.1 9 6 In
National Parks, the Ninth Circuit refused to accept the Parks Service's assertion that the environmental effects were unknown and
stated that when the effects can be obtained during the preparatory
process, an agency must complete an EIS. 197 Unlike the environmental effects in National Parks, the bald eagle effects in Flowers are
truly unattainable. 198 The court properly noted that, because past
bald eagle behavior cannot be used to predict future behavior, further studies would be futile. 99 The Flowers court, therefore, utilized
190. See Nat'l Parks, 241 F.3d at 736-37 (concluding controversy standard was

met).
191. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1275 (noting point of alleged controversy).
192. See id. (discussing dispute regarding bendway weirs).
193. See Nat'l Parks, 241 F.3d at 737 n.17 (citing Wetlands Action Network v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000)) (stating
agency may rely on its own expert).
194. See id. at 737 (indicating disagreement among experts not sufficient to
require EIS).
195. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1275 (concluding disagreements regarding
bendway weirs did not "cast serious doubt" on Corps' conclusions).
196. See id. at 1274-75 (distinguishing Nat'l Parks' facts).
197. See Nat'l Parks, 241 F.3d at 737 (stating that when information concerning effects can be reasonably obtained during prepatory process, courts will not
excuse agency from completing EIS).
198. See flowers, 359 F.3d at 1276 (adopting Corps' understanding that further
studies will not elucidate effects on bald eagles). In National Parks, the Ninth Circuit concluded further studies would help in determining environmental effects.
See Nat'l Parks, 241 F.3d at 737.
199. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1276 (acknowledging futility in conducting further studies on bald eagle response to human environment).
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the standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit in NationalParks by con200
cluding that further studies would be fruitless.
3.

The Role of Mitigation

The Tenth Circuit properly concluded that the mitigation
techniques were sufficient to offset any adverse effects on the Snake
River and the bald eagles. 20 1 The Flowers court decision thus followed precedent set by other circuits. 20 2 As the NationalParks court
stated, the proposed mitigation techniques must be reasonably developed. 20 3 In NationalParks, the Parks Service provided no criteria
for ongoing examination and failed to provide any corrective action. 20 4 Conversely, in Flowers, the mitigation techniques provided
for further examination and action in case the techniques required
modification.

205

The mitigation techniques implemented for the bald eagle's
benefit were also more concrete than the techniques proposed in
National Parks.20 6 The mitigation techniques in Flowers are more
closely akin to the techniques advanced in Horseshoe Bend.20 7 Similar to Flowers, the techniques used in Horseshoe Bend were more certain and more comprehensive than the techniques implemented by
the Parks Service in NationalParks.20 8 Thus, because the techniques
are certain and reasonably related to the adverse effects that they
were designed to offset, the Flowers court did not err in concluding
20 9
that an EIS was unnecessary.
200. See id. (concluding deficiency of information did not result from lack of
thorough investigation).
201. See id. at 1275-76 (discussing mitigation techniques to offset impact on
Snake River and bald eagles).
202. See, e.g., Fiends of Payette v. Horseshoe Bend Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d 989,
993-94 (9th Cir. 1993) (determining mitigation techniques rendered environmental impact minor); Nat'l Parks, 241 F.3d at 733 (concluding mitigation efforts were
uncertain).
203. See Nat'l Parks, 241 F.3d at 733 (indicating level of development necessary
for sufficient mitigation techniques).
204. See id. at 734 (discussing gaps in mitigation techniques).
205. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1265 (listing mitigation techniques for bald eagle
impact). The techniques implemented to offset the effects of the bendway weirs
incorporated criteria for ongoing examination and removal of the weirs if they
produced adverse effects. See id. at 1267.
206. See id. at 1276 (discussing sufficiency of mitigation techniques to offset
adverse bald eagle effect).
207. See HorseshoeBend, 988 F.2d at 993-94 (noting mitigation techniques implemented to benefit wetlands, bald eagles).
208. See id. (assessing adequacy of mitigation efforts).
209. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1275-76 (discussing mitigation techniques to offset environmental consequences).
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207

IMPACT

As an environmentalist once said, "[t]here are no victories in
the environmental movement, only stays of execution." 210 Unfortu-

nately, the Corps and the Tenth Circuit did not give the Canyon
Club area wetlands such a reprieve. 211 The Tenth Circuit's holding
that the Corps did not violate the CWA in determining that the 359acre proposal was the least damaging practicable alternative will
have adverse effects on the environment. 2 12 These wetlands will
soon join the 300,000 acres of wetlands that are obliterated in the

United States each year. 2 13 Furthermore, allowing Canyon Club to
dredge and fill the wetlands will destroy wildlife habitats and in2 14
crease water pollution.

In discussing Yellowstone's claim that the Corps should have

considered other alternatives, the Tenth Circuit recognized the restrictions placed on Canyon Club designed to reduce the wetland
impact.2 1 5 The Tenth Circuit sent a message to other jurisdictions
that mitigation techniques have a role in determining the least
damaging practicable alternative.2 1 6 Although mitigation techniques are crucial for a thriving environment, they have no place in
assessing practicable alternatives. 21 7 In the end, the impact of the

Tenth Circuit's decision indicates that the fight to save wetlands
continues and courts need a better understanding of the proper
role of mitigation when evaluating practicable alternatives.
Shaena N. Doherty
210. See Andy Goodman, 10 Principlesfor Effective Advocacy Campaigns (Oct.
2000), http://www.agoodmanonline.com/newsletter/archive/2000_10.htm (quoting David Brower, late author and environmentalist).
211. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1279 (upholding Corps' decision to issue permit
allowing dredge and fill of wetlands).
212. For a discussion of the impact on the environment of the Tenth Circuit's
holding, see infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
213. See Ausness, supra note 2, at 356 (examining damage done to wetlands).
214. See id. at 358 (noting dredge and fill effects).
215. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 1271 (noting wetland mitigation efforts).
216. See Schoenbaum & Stewart, supra note 184, at 253 (discussing role of
mitigation in practicable alternatives assessment).
217. See id. (noting that mitigation should not be considered in evaluating
alternatives).
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